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Say No to Fungibility！Resisting Neoliberalism in the Name of the Universal-Particular

Paul Allen Miller [1]

中文摘要 本文首先回顾了马克思对于商品以及作为一般等价物的货币的定义。进而提出：在商品化和数字化的世界中必须坚持普遍的特殊性，这就是说：个体的经验不可缩减，但同时又需要将这种经验转化成他人可辨识的形式以便与他人共同形成有意义的行动。讨论这种理论困境之后，本文讨论了三个抵抗缩减替代性的例子：杜拉斯小说《塔尔奎尼亚的小马》中的荒诞感，作为一种精神实践形式的禅宗公案以及苏格拉底对悖论探求。最后本文探讨了亚里士多德在《诗学》中的观点，他指出诗比历史更具哲理性的原因就在于诗虽然着眼于普遍性，但同时处理的都是特殊经验。

关键词 商品；可替代性；马克思；禅宗；苏格拉底；普遍性；特殊性

Abstract This paper begins with a reading of Marx’s definition of the commodity and of money as the universal equivalent.It argues that the world of commodification and digitality must be resisted on multiple fronts，but above all by insisting on the universal particular，that is to say，on both the irreducibility of our experience and the simultaneous need to translate that experience into terms capable of being recognized by others and able to organize others for meaningful action.After this theoretical preliminary，it looks at three examples of resistance to reductive fungibility：the absurd in Duras’s Les petits chevaux de Tarquinia，Zen Koans as a spiritual practice，and the Socratic pursuit of aporia.The paper will close with a meditation on Aristotle’s claim in the Poetics that poetry is more philosophical than history because poetry is both addressed to the universal and deals only in the particular.

Keywords commodity，fungibility，Marx，Zen，Socrates，universal，particular.

The first premise of knowledge in the culture of neoliberalism is digitality：the ability to represent all significant qualia in numerical terms，and therefore the infinite reproducibility of those same qualia.The unique，the local，the unrepeatable，is by definition from this perspective ephemeral，lacking in significance，and in all likelihood illusory.It is not “evidence based”，not “testable”.This premise of digitality and reproducibility is what guarantees the rationality of our scientific，economic，and political enterprises in the neoliberal universe，a set of qualities that posits an epistemic ontology in which objects are only knowable to the extent they are subject to calculation.Truly meaningful experience should be reducible to a universal measure.Neoliberalism is，in this sense，profoundly Platonist.

In the neoliberal university，therefore，we need to be able to show the value added of every class and to quantify that addition in uniform terms.What cannot be measured does not exist.The neoliberal university accordingly has as its ideal the perfect fungibility of knowledge and experience.From teaching evaluations，to assessment，to value added，biochemistry and romantic poetry should be quantifiable in comparable if not identical ways and a rubric produced in which each could be evaluated along a range of possible axes using identical terms.

The analogue world of traditional liberal education，however，resists this ideal and is haunted by an irreducible aura，a residual authenticity，that even on some infinitesimal level precludes the perfect repeatability of a string of ones and zeroes.If your experience of a painting，poem，or sonata is identical with mine，then the object of that experience has been reduced to the information it contains and so can be replaced by that information or its quantifiable effects.There is no difference，in principle，between a resumé of that information as well as of its effects and the experience itself，and therefore the experience itself is expendable，replaceable.This is what fungibility means：there is no consequential difference between my experience of a performance of Oedipus and its summary.Thus，the argument that the humanities and the arts open us to experiences that are meaningful in themselves collapses before the insistent rationality of the calculable.If your experience of a painting，poem，or sonata is identical with mine，then the object of that experience has been reduced to asset of calculable information.You don’t need to read Plato or Confucius：an exposition of the basic argument is the same thing.

Moreover，a flattening of the world to a strict economy of the quantifiable renders life both frighteningly meaningless and subject to the most extreme irrationalities，since what is not reducible to the logic of the commodity is excluded from the rational and becomes the province of faith，belief，and at its most extreme fanaticism.It is no accident that the neoliberal world order has seen a variety of religious fundamentalisms on the rise.The world becomes split between a ruthless economic logic and an equally ruthless assertion of pure belief with no room for discussion，no room for reasoned dialogue.If we are to recover the possibility of meaningful future，we must recover the possibility of a logos，a word，a logic，that embraces the particular in the moment of its universalization，that recognizes in the unrepeatable the possibility of freedom.

The connection between the digital and the neoliberal economy of the commodity，I would argue，is not accidental.Digital reproducibility is the predicate for a globalized capitalist culture：the dream of a universal market in which films，food，and fashion flow effortlessly across a digital pipeline.Adorno and Horkheimer’s nightmare of the culture industry（1973）may finally find its realization in the fusion of Disney，Amazon，and Whole Foods with the Spelling report’s vision of higher education as a “mature industry”（2006）.Such a world—to paraphrase Benjamin（1969），the work of life in the age of digital reproduction！—is also necessarily that of perfect commodification，one in which use value has been all but completely reduced to the liquidity of exchange value，in which ones and zeroes have become synonymous with the flow of global capital.

This paper will begin，then，with a reading of Marx’s definition of the commodity and of money as the universal equivalent.It will argue that the world of commodification and digitality must be resisted on multiple fronts，but above all by insisting on the universal particular，that is to say，on both the irreducibility of our experience and the simultaneous need to translate that experience into terms capable of being recognized by others and able to organize others for meaningful action.After this theoretical preliminary，we will then look at three examples of resistance to reductive fungibility：the absurd in Duras’s Les petits chevaux de Tarquinia，Zen Koans as a spiritual practice，and the Socratic pursuit of aporia.These examples will lead us to a discussion of the need to resist the demand for commodification，which is implicit in the neoliberal model of higher education.The paper will close with a meditation on Aristotle’s claim in the Poetics that poetry is more philosophical than history because poetry is both addressed to the universal and deals only in the particular.It is，I will argue，the realm of the universal particular par excellence and that what Duras，Zen，and Socrates have in common is precisely a radical poesis that offers an image of what a utopian resistance to our commodified fungibility might mean.

In many ways，Marx’s understanding of the commodity remains，to paraphrase Jameson，the untranscendable horizon of the modern and postmodern world（1981：17）.The commodity is equally the most basic form of the digital universe.It is the world of experience reducible to its most basic quantitative（and hence iterative）expression：money，exchange value.The commodity in capitalist production and exchange—as well as in our digital instantiations，representations，and assessments of the capitalist life-world—functions as the fundamental definition of the object qua object，as what literally counts as real.The commodity is a logical necessity for the existence of the neoliberal life-world and its bedrock ontological reality.

In Marx’s great logical fable，when the world was young，two producers stood before each other，each holding an object that possessed a potential utility for the other.I stand with my bushel of millet and you with your lump of iron.Initially，we are perplexed.Although each of us could make use of the object of the other，how do determine what would constitute a fair trade？How do we compare such incommensurable objects？According to what scale can we measure the possibility of their exchange？These objects in their sensuous qualities and their potential uses could not be more different.There is no practical situation in which the one could be substituted for the other.But through the magic of commodity exchange they become part of an endless chain of substitutions，in which each can become the equivalent of every other object in this universe，be it boots，books，or bourbon.What these objects have in common is not a material property shared by the things themselves.Their utilities are so radically different，their individual properties so fundamentally opposed，that it is only in reference to some third entity that they can become comparable.The one thing these two objects have in common，although in neither case is it a material property of the object itself，is the fact that they were produced，that they are the products of human labor.That labor value may have only a tangential relationship to the actual use value of the object for a given producer，but it has a direct relationship to the effort expended.Likewise，though we may think of certain objects as inherently valuable—diamonds，gold，and other precious objects—none of those have any exchange value until they are mined，refined or otherwise produced，until they enter the market place and assume their positions vis-à-vis one another：a pound of flax，a pound of coal，an ounce of gold，a book，a poem，or a painting.As exchanges become more routine and less a series of one-off unrepeatable events，there arises a need to find a stable universal equivalent for the expression of the exchange values of a wide variety objects and hence to make all objects comparable and expressible in terms of this universal equivalent，which in turn becomes what we know as money.

In early forms，money is itself a thing of value，and we may fetishize its value as the reason money has worth：gold，silver，iron bars，or even cattle（pecus，“herd” in Latin gives us the word pecunia，“money”）.But the fact that these various currencies are themselves exchangeable shows that they are but momentary instantiations of a more abstract and universal form which can be expressed in any symbolic mode of inscription：paper，plastic，even electrons.The universal equivalent can symbolize all values precisely because in its function as the universal equivalent it has no value in and of itself.It is pure relationality.

The universal equivalent or money form in turn makes possible large-scale production and exchange.I can hire a group of producers，pay them for their labor and realize in exchange a surplus value beyond what I have paid them.This makes possible not only my profit but also，and perhaps more importantly，the accumulation of capital，which can be used to build factories，digital platforms and other assemblages that magnify the power of individual labor.This surplus value in turn can be used to generate new forms of monetary accumulation through finance capital and other means of speculation that are ultimately disconnected from either the original use value of the object or the experience of labor that first brought it into the world.I can speculate on currency fluctuations，minor shifts in stock values，or engage in various forms of arbitrage that produce exchange value with little if any reference to an original act of labor that produced a useful object.The measure of a value that allowed one incommensurable object to be compared with another incommensurable object comes to replace the objects themselves，producing a flat plane of value in which widely disparate objects and activities are all rendered equivalent to one another and in which the measure comes to reproduce itself and have concrete effects in a world that it was initially intended to represent.

As Marx himself memorably expressed it：

In order，therefore，that a commodity may in practice operate effectively as exchange-value，it must divest itself of its natural physical body and become transformed from merely imaginary into real gold….Though a commodity may，alongside its real shape（iron，for instance），possess an ideal value-shape or an imagined gold-shape in the form of its price，it cannot simultaneously be both real iron and real gold.To establish its price，it is sufficient for it to be equated with gold in the imagination.But to enable it to render its owner the service of universal equivalent，it must be actually replaced by gold.（Marx 1977：197）

Money becomes the measure of all things because money literally represents the digitalization of the life world.Things only exist in objective form within the digital/capitalist life-world—that is to say they are only abstracted from subjective experience and hence the world of opinion—to the extent that they can be expressed in quantitative and repeatable forms，which in turn renders only the commodity，or at least the commodifiable，the object qua object of experience.Hence，when we are asked to express the value added to a student’s education of the reading of a given poem，the experience of another culture，or the development of creativity or critical thinking，this must be expressed in terms of a quantitative reduction，i.e.，a “scientific”，“evidence-based” approach，which can be translated into some form of universal equivalent allowing the comparison of incommensurable objects，which means ultimately it must be expressed in terms that are expressible in monetary form.

Within this life-world，the humanities per se can never have value.The point of education in the humanities is precisely to stand against the fungibility of our experiences，of their reduction to a universal equivalent，because the basic premise of that equivalent and the reason why it is so incredibly powerful lies precisely in the fact of its reduction.If we cannot measure the utility of reading a poem by John Donne，a novel by Toni Morrison，the Analects of Confucius，or a play by Berthold Brecht，then we cannot say the value added.That value literally does not exist.At the same time，to the extent we can express this value in terms of a universal equivalent，then the particularity of the experience of necessity becomes occluded.There is no material difference between the experience of reading the text and receiving the information communicated by the text，which logically means there is no difference between reading the text and receiving it in a predigested or summary form.Hence the text itself becomes superfluous as does the particularity of the culture from which it derives and in which it is experienced.Each is just another click on the Amazon or WeChat market place，another choice on Spotify，an option on a menu.

At the same time，the ability to be critical of the commodified life-world in and of itself becomes lost.There is no place outside its equivalencies from which to stand.An act of truly critical thinking becomes impossible because there is no locus from which the ironic perspective necessary to both accept the terms of communications and turn them aside from their accustomed track can be articulated.Yet this is precisely what the humanities does.It turns from the accustomed world in which our identities are pregiven and the object world is already defined，and turns back to the world per se，the world before the given object，a world in which the universal equivalent runs aground on the shoals of the Real.It does so from an ironic perspective precisely because it must speak in terms of the universal and the repeatable in order to be understood，in order for the cash value of its propositions to be received，and at the same time it must give those terms new values that cause us to question the fundamental nature of our given reality and to reveal an immediate terrifying and beautiful world underneath.Only in the face of this revelation can real change occur.Only then can we go beyond the already coded，the already given.In what remains，I want to give you three examples of what I am talking about before concluding with a reflection on how this joining of the universal with the particular lies at the heart of Aristotle’s definition of poetry.

In 1953，Marguerite Duras published Les petits chevaux de Tarquinia，her last major novel before the groundbreaking publication of Moderato Cantabile in 1958，which announced her mature style.In this under-read novel from the period between her early Faulknerian work and the later elliptical style that was assimilated to what became known as the nouveau roman，Duras tells the story of five well-educated members of the French bourgeoisie on what appears to be a miserable and boring vacation in a small Italian town during a sweltering heat wave.In the midst of their complaints about the food，the heat，and each other，their flirtations and adultery，set in the period immediately following the Second World War，another very different reality intrudes and plays itself out in the hills above the seaside town.A young Italian whose job was to remove landmines from the surrounding landscape has accidentally blown himself up.His parents，peasants from the countryside，have gathered up his scattered bits and pieces and put them in a soap crate provided by a local grocer.Together they keep vigil on the crate，while the mother refuses to sign her son’s death certificate without explaining why.

Each day the French tourists take a break from their bickering and ennui to pay a call on these peasants，bring them some food，and then return below.The juxtapositions can be very jarring.At one point，three of the women are discussing whether monogamy means you do not like to make love.Two agree and the third calls the other two whores，to which Sara replies，“It seems to me I could do it with fifty men.”The scene then switches：

The parents of the young minesweeper…were there still，waiting，in the shade of two sections of the wall.In front of them was a soap crate of average dimensions.…They gathered there all the debris they had found of their child’s body.The crate was now nailed shut.There was a bottle of wine，some glasses，a loaf of bread，a piece of sausage，and some oranges.The old people were seated on the ground in front of the crate，the grocer a bit to the side.Two young customs agents kept watch while waiting for the parents to decide to sign the death certificate.They were also seated on the ground，in the black pile of stones from the explosion，in the shade of the other section of wall.…the shade of the walls was at this time so slender that they were seated with the others in front of the soap crate，like they were friends.（Duras 2011：844）[2]

In the seaside world below，words are exchanged like tokens.What is said often seems of little importance.The social niceties are observed.Boredom，anger，and lust are both acknowledged and passed over in a discourse that has very little purchase on the world.Social exchange is pursued with little acknowledgement of its real or imagined utility.But on the hillside，the terror of the Real obtrudes.Not in the world of discourse，but precisely in its lacunae，as we imagine the lumps of rotting flesh in the crate，whose odor is masked by the chemical smell of laundry detergent，and as the inexorable march of bureaucratic efficiency is stalled before the stolid silence of a grieving mother’s refusal to participate.

In the moment of this encounter between divergent worlds，all the pretensions of normality that mask the empty exchanges of bourgeois life are brought up short before both the barreness of the Real and the bittersweet utopian promise of a world of simpler，more genuine human emotions.There is，on the one hand，the reality of a meaningless loss，the byproduct of a war now over but still producing death and destruction.The reasons the mines were planted are long gone，but the destruction continues，embodied in the death of the young minesweeper.That death，moreover，has been boxed and commodified like the soap once held in the container.On the other hand，there is the heart-wrenching loss of a child’s death，the unvarnished reality of which is driven home by the peasant status of the minesweeper’s parents，metonymically represented by the remains of their simple meal：some wine，some bread，a piece of sausage，a bit of fruit，a world foreign to the pointless bourgeois frolics on the beach below.There is also the powerlessness of the functionaries of the state before the parents’ refusal to acknowledge either their authority or the finality of their son’s death，to validate in the social Symbolic the loss torn open in the fabric of the Real.And yet，there remains a moment of possible community.A group of people have come together amidst the ruins，amidst their differences，come together in sympathy—a Greek word for “suffering together，” for “suffering with.”They “were seated with the others in front of the soap crate，like they were friends，” as if they represented a genuine community of fellow feeling and mutual support.

It is this short circuiting of our everyday fetishistic reality that Duras’s novel captures so well，the emptying out of the relentlessly homogenizing cast of conventional discourse.This is the primary function of the zen koan as well，a form of discourse whose impossibility is designed to explode our ordinary habits of mind or mindlessness，and indeed the false opposition between the two.

Koans take as their subjects tangible，down-to-earth objects such as a dog，a tree，a face，a finger to make us see，on the one hand，that each object has an absolute value and，on the other，to arrest the tendency of the intellect to anchor itself in abstract concepts.But the import of every koan is the same：that the world is one interdependent Whole and that each separate one of us is that Whole.（Kapleau 1989：70）

The koan is the antithesis of the universal equivalent.Each koan is a little logical trap that at once invites analysis and pushes it away，always revealing more the limits of our conceptual structures than the possibility of there being a right answer to these maddening questions.When the student is asked，what is her original face，before her father and mother conceived her，she is plunged into both the confrontation with her own non-existence and a simultaneous urge to assert our continued identity.In the story of the monk Joshu being asked if a dog has the Buddha nature，when it is a basic tenet of Mahayana Buddhism that all sentient beings have Buddha nature，we learn that Joshu shouts “Mu” or “no/nothing.”Does the dog not have it or is the nature that the dog has “nothing”：a reality beyond any particular instantiation or coding？“Trying to solve Mu rationally，we are told by the masters，is like ‘trying to smash one’s fist through an iron wall’”.（Kapleau 1989：69-70a）The paradox and contradiction with accepted doctrine this little story embodies forces a confrontation with the emptiness that is both one understanding of the Buddha nature and its negation

In each of these little stories，we have both an acceptance of the necessity of the world of normal discourse，otherwise the case could not be posed，and the rejection of its fundamental terms.It is the power of the koan to both accept the world of things as given and to reveal the utter contingency of our thoughts about those things.It stands at the opposite extreme of commodified thought，of a theory of value that is based solely on the conventions that make operative the universal equivalent，in which my experience of the koan，or Duras’s novel，or the world of things themselves is ultimately assigned a place in the world of being that is equivalent to a measure of iron，a pound of flax，or anything else that flows seamlessly through the world of social exchange.While Buddhist thought is as subject to mystification as any other form that becomes a codified set of conventions，including the wooden verities of conventional “scientific socialism”，the moment of mindfulness produced by the simultaneous presence of absolute concentration and the radical questioning of the terms of the given world offers an important point of access to understanding how a world inexpressible in terms of the universal equivalent might appear（Sheng-Yen 2002：49）.In this regard it is important to keep in mind Shunryu Suzuki’s definition of wisdom：

By wisdom we do not mean some particular faculty or philosophy.It is the readiness of the mind that is wisdom.So wisdom could be various philosophies and teachings，and various kinds of research and studies.But we should not become attached to some particular wisdom，such as that which was taught by the Buddha.Wisdom is not something to learn.（1970：115）

It is not a skill set，a group of competencies to be mastered.The radically disorienting questioning of the most basic ways we understand the objects of our life-world is a form of wisdom irreducible to the terms of exchange.

Where the postwar absurdism of Duras and the deliberate cultivation of no-thingness in the Buddhist tradition，on a certain level，appear to represent a rejection of rationality，that is less the case than a superficial understanding may make it appear.It is not so much that either of these discourses denies the cogency or effectiveness of a given logical system，of a given set of ratios and equivalences，as it is that they observe the radical contingency of those systems on a certain constitution of the phenomenal world，a certain givenness of the object world and hence of our place within it.And it is precisely the questioning of that givenness that Socrates，the founder of Western philosophy and its profound commitment to rationality，introduced on the streets of Athens.His request that each of us be able to offer an account（logos）of what we know and how we know it，in many of the most famous dialogues，leads not to a set of unquestionable verities but to aporia and perplexity.In the Apology，Socrates is shown to be the wisest of men only after he exhibits a superior awareness of the limits of his own thought and of his own profound ignorance by questioning the presumed experts of ancient Athens：the political leaders，the poets，and the craftsmen.His approach was deliberately disorienting and disturbing，comparing himself to a stinging fly striving to awaken a slumbering horse（Apology 30e），or being compared in the Meno to a sting ray：

Socrates，I used to be told，before I began to meet you，that yours was just a case of being in doubt yourself and making others doubt also：and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations，which have reduced me to utter perplexity.And if I am indeed to have my jest，I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish；for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it，and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now.For in truth，I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed，and I am at a loss what answer to give you.And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people—and very good speeches they were，so I thought—but now I cannot say one word as to what it is.You are well advised，I consider，in not voyaging or taking a trip away from home；for if you went on like this as a stranger in any other city you would very likely be taken up for a wizard（Meno 79e-80b；Lamb 1967）.

Far from providing answers to questions，Socrates often only gives us more questions and questions that we cannot answer，and yet in the end，those who stay around to hear，who do not react in anger，are driven to question themselves，to seek to know themselves，even to care for themselves（Apology 31b；Hadot 1995：55-57，105；Hunter 2004：86-87）.The Socratic logos—word，story，reason，account—as exemplified in the Platonic dialogues is not the ratio of accountancy.It is not a fixed set of equivalencies between already established entities whose values are known.Rather it starts consistently from the moment of a particular observation，then seeks to examine the possibility of universalizing that observation as a general rule or form of experience or knowledge（eidos）before returning to that understanding of universal form’s inadequacy，and hence provisional nature，before the particularities of our experience.Though space does not allow it here，this pattern can be shown again and again throughout the dialogues，from the shorter aporetic dialogues to the more monumental “constructive” works of the Republic，Symposium，Theaetetus，or the Philebus.

And indeed it is precisely in this unceasing dialectic between the universal and the particular that the humanities，and poetry in the large Aristotelian sense，finds its purchase.For while I have been emphasizing the importance of the particular and the unrepeatable in contrast to the homogenizing and acid force of the universal equivalent，before which “all that is solid melts into air”（Marx and Engels 2012：38），if you return briefly to Marx’s logical fable，before the advent of at least some momentary general equivalency，you simply had two mutes standing before each other，one with his bushel of millet，the other with his lump of iron.The challenge is not to return to a world of dumb show and incomprehension，but not to let the relentless digital rationality of the commodity form become the sole or even primary index of our ontology，the thing by which we exclusively measure the reality of our observations，the meaning of our experiences.It is neither in the universal，which always must impoverish our particular experience，nor in the particular per se，which can never produce the repeatable and the intelligible but only the inarticulacy of the utterly unique and ungeneralizable，that freedom and meaning lie，as well as the possibility of human liberation，but only in their dialectic，only in the possibility of their momentary fusion and incessant disaggregation and deconstruction.It is this interaction which is the motor of history both in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit and Marx’s regrounding of it in the materiality of history，when as he says in the second postscript to Capital，he turned Hegel on his head.

Yet，in the cultural realm，the universal-particular reaches its fullest expression not in philosophy or science，but precisely in poetry，as Aristotle understood it，or，as we might say more broadly today，in literature.In the Poetics，Aristotle speaks of three modes of discourse，the philosophical，which deals with the universal，the historical，which deals with the particular，and the poetic whose defining characteristic is not a certain formal quality such as meter，rhythm，or even a given type of mise-en-scene，but precisely the ability to speak of the universal in terms of the particular，to tell stories or give voice people in accord with what seems probable or necessary.The poet according to Aristotle，I would argue，is less someone who finds himself halfway between the historian and philosopher，in a kind of mushy middle，than precisely the artist who is able to speak the truth of the universal through the evocation of the particular：rendering the irreducibly particular intelligible to a wide variety of experiences，and revealing the way in which universal always fall short of unrepeatable，concrete sensuality of that experience，even as it is what makes that experience intelligible，literally thinkable：

It is clear from what has already been said that the work of the poet is not to say what has happened，but what sorts of things might happen and might be possible according to the likely and the necessary.（1451a 36-38）

That is to say，the poet’s role is to speak of those things that could happen in so far as they participate in the larger，universalizing categories of what is probable and what is necessary，but only doing so in the particular.

For the historian and the poet differ not in this，whether they speak in meter or not（for it would be possible to put the matter of Herodotus into meter and，nonetheless，it would be history with or without meter），but in this：the one speaks of the things that happened，the other of the things that might be.Clearly poetry is both more philosophical and more serious than history：for poetry speaks more of things that are of the universal and history speaks of things according to the particular.Those things are of the universal，which are the sorts of things a certain type of person happens to say or do in accord with what is probable or necessary，at which poetry aims when supplying them names.History speaks according to the particular，saying what Alcibiades did or experienced.（1451a 38-1451b 11）

The poet is the writer or speaker who gives voice to the universal in the particular，to make them both speak in a singular moment.Hence，I would contend the role of the poet is ultimately to launch a reasoned and moving critique of both the universal and the particular，to display both their interdependence and the continuing need to deconstruct any fetishistic hierarchy of this opposition.It is on this ground that the humanities must stake their claim in the neoliberal university，a ground that refuses both false equivalencies and definitions of value that are predicated on and reproduce a commodified life-world.

In the end，then，we must not refuse rationality，but we must also accept that rationalities are multiple and that the choice of one interpretive grid over another has consequences and promotes or diminishes certain interests，certain investments.What the humanities does，with its focus both on the irreducibly particular as expressed through the universal and on the necessity of the universal to illuminate the particular，is constantly to put into question the necessity of any one of those grids，of any given ontology of the true.The neoliberal fusion of the digital with the verifiable and hence with the veritable is neither the only or the necessary arbiter of truth in any given instance，but is instead，in large part，an artifact of the hegemony of the commodity in global capitalism.So long as that is the sole standard by which value is determined and truth assigned，Aristotle’s poets will not be able to defend themselves，and the lifeworld itself will be drained of all that is not expressible in terms of the universal equivalent.The resultant vacuum will offer not the emptiness of enlightenment but a space in which fanaticism and irrationalism can grow unhindered by the restrictions with which truth itself has been shackled.

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[1] 作者为美国南卡罗莱纳大学比较文学教授，《中美比较文学》外方主编。研究方向为古典学、比较文学。

[2] All translations are my own unless otherwise specified.